This paper descrihcs how confidentiality and authentication can he applied in a manner that allows mid-network adaptation of protected JPSEC streams while preserving end-to-end security. We achicvcd this by designing the JPSEC syntax to support the principles o f secure scalable streaming and secure transcoding [3.4. SI. Specifically.
1.
I t i s often desireable to give senders and mid-network entities, such as caching servers, the ability to adapt or transcode compressed images for downstream client capabilities or network conditions. m e JPEG-2000 image coding standard [ I ] was designed for compression and scalability, where scalability refers to the ability to extract portions of a coded image from a JPEC-2000 codestream without requiring full decoding. This inherent scalability greatly facilitates adaptive streaming and transcoding for applications such as remote browsing and streaming [6, 7] . are underway to incorporate security services into the JPEC-2003 standard [21. These include many aspects of security such as confidentiality [81, authentication [9], integrity, conditional access [IO, I I] . and ownership protection. These security services arc achieved using techniques such as encryption, authentication, key generation and management, scrambling, and watermarking.
Protecting the confidentiality ofa JPEG-2000codestream means encrypting the data so that eavesdroppers can not decode the image. The simplest way to do this i s to encrypt the entire codestream and to do so with a key that i s only held by the allowed users. This protects the data from eavesdroppers who do not have the key. I t also provides the desirable property of end-to-end security, where the content i s locked by the sender, unlocked hy allowed receivers, and remains encrypted at a11 points in between.
When the entire cndestream is encrypted, the inherent scalability pmperty is lost, and the only way IO transcode the stream i s to give the transcoder the key to allow it to decrypt and transcode the content. In this case. every transcoder becomes a possible point of attack for the system. Furthermore, this mid-network decryption compromises the end-to-end security o f the system. we designed JPSEC to provide confidentiality and authentication in a manner that allows mid-network transcodin: of protected JPSEC codeslrrams while preserving end-to-end security.
A JPSEC secure transcoding system is shown in Figure I . An original imagc i s encoded into a JPEG-Z(KI0 codcstream. which i s then locked with a key to form a JPSEC codestream. This JPSEC codestream can be transcoded without the key to form a transcoded JPSEC codestream. The original and transcoded JPSEC codestreams can be unlocked and decoded by authorized entities with the appropriate key to recnnstruct the full and transcoded images. header, and i t includes the parameters that a JPSEC consumer needs to interpret and process the protected stream.
JPSEC provides protection templates for decryption, authentication, data integrity, and scrambling that can he used to protect a JPEC-2000 codestream. These templates specify parameters for these protection methods, e.g., a decryption template cnn specify using AES decryption in cipher block chaining mode and an authentication template can specify using HMAC with SHA-I. For each template protection tool, the signaling information conveys three types of information: 0-7803-8554-3/04/$20.00 02004 IEEE.
Zone o f Influence: Describes the area influenced by the protection tmI using ima,ye-and birsrr~nm-rel~iredpara,,,eters.
Template parameters: Specify the template type and its parameters.
Processing parameters: Describe how the protection method is applied to the data, including the domain where thc data i s processed and the granularity with which it is applied.
The Zone of lnlluencc (201) caii serve a numher o f purposes. First, it tells a JPSEC consumer which part of the data to process by using the ZOl's bitstream-related parameters. For example. in the case nf decryption it can tell a JPSEC consumer to decrypt hytes 0 through 2078 using the specified decryption method. The ZOl's bitstream-related parameters can specify data by byte ranges or JPEG--2000 packet indices.
In addition. the ZOI can he used to semantically describe the imagc area influenced by the protection method by using the 7.01's image-related parameters, For example. in the case or authentication the ZOI can he used 10 indicate that an authentication code has been computed for the lowest-resolution compment, so a JPSEC consumer can verify that low-resolution transcoding was performed in a permissihle manner. Also. in the case o f selective encryption, the ZOI can indicate that the higher resolution levels have been protected and thus need a key to be decrypted. The ZOl's image-related parameters can specify acombination o f image arcas, tiles, precincts. color components. resolution levels. and quality layers.
Finally, the ZOI can he used to identify the correspondence be- 
DESIGNING ENCRYPTION & AUTHENTICATION T O SUPPORT JPSEC SECURE TRANSCODING
A key feature ofJPEG-2000 is the scalability that i t provides. Specifically, the standard was designed for easy access to subsets of coded image data; this greatly facilitates operations such as adaptive streaming and transcoding. JPSEC provides protection tools for JPEG-2000 codestreams. However, when applying these tools one must he aware of the impact on JPEG-2000 features such as scalability.
This section describes how encryption and authentication can be applied in JPSEC to enable secure transcoding. We consider the system shown in Figure I , where a lock module creates the JPSEC protected codestream from a JPEG-2000 codestream, and an unlock module performs the inverse procedure that can be applied to the original or tnnscoded JPSEC codestream. I n this example, the lock module provides two security services: encryption and authentication. The unlock module is the reverse operation and has two parts:
verify authentication and decryption. 2) inserts metadala in the SEC marker segment that provides information about the encrypted data segments. A JPSEC creator can use this method to encrypt data segments that contain certain image features, such as the low-resolution component or lowest quality layer of the image. Because larger segments o f data are encrypted together across packet headers and bodies, this lowers the complexity of the encryptioddecryption operation as compared to the packetbody encryption method. The metadata can include both the imagerelated and bitstream-related parameten i n the Zone o f Influence to represent the correspondence between encrypted data segments and image features. An entity can use these ZOI parameters to securely transcode the JPSEC codestream by reading the parameters and then extracting the appropriate data segments: thus, this method greatly reduces the complexity o f the transcoder. On the other hand, i t also reduces the transcoding flexibility o f the JPSEC codestream because i t only allows access to the image units that were made accessible hy the JPSEC creator. An added benefit i s that because the transcoding information i s placed in the metadata, it also allows the JPSEC crcator to encrypt many o f the JPEG-2000 marker segments and hide the boundaries of individual packets. Thus, this method allows improved privacy and reduced transcoding complexity over packet-body encryption at the expense o f transcoding flexibility. Table 3 . I summarizes the tradeoffs of thesc methods in terms o f privacy. transcodahility. clratclconsume complexity, and transccxling complexity. File-based encryption provides the highest lcvel of protection and has the lowest encryptionldccryption complexity, but i t does not allow secure transcoding. i.e., transcoding without decryption. At the other extreme. packet-body encryption provides full transcoding flexibility similar to transctxling unprotected JPEG-2000 codestreams, since only the coded image data itsel f i s encrypted, and the hits describing the coding parameters are left unencryptcd. Howvcr, the creation, consumption, and transcoding complexity are relatively high. The approach using segment-based encryption with metadala hits the niiddlc ground in terms o f privacy, transcodability, and crcatelconsume complexity. Furthermore. it enables the lowest complexity transcoding. and thus is most suitable for transcoding large numbers of stmams. In the next section, we show cxamplcs o f this approach. Note that file-bascd encryption does not use mctadata; packet-based encryption uses only the metadata in thc JPEC-2(XM header; while the segment-based approach uses additional metidata, such as ZOls for cach srgment. 
Authentication
Authentication can be performed with a number of authentication tools that compute the Message Authentication Code (MAC) for a subset of data using an authentication key. This M A C value i s sent to the receiver with the data. The receiver then uses the authentication key to compute the MAC of the received content and compares i t with the received MAC value in order to verify the authenticity of the received content. Since the MAC i s cryptographically locked, it is not practically possible for an attacker to manipulate the data and compute a new M A C which will pass authentication at the receiver without knowledge of the key. In our system we performed the authentication using HMAC, which i s a keyed hash algorithm, using SHA-I as the hash. However, other authentication methods can also be used, such as cipher-based MACs or digital signatures. The JPSEC creator computes a MAC for each allowed transcodable result and stores these MACs in the JPSEC marker segment. A JPSEC consumer uses these MACs to verify that the received JPSEC stream was transcoded in a valid and permissible manner. I t i s often useful to truncate the MACs in order to provide a tradeoff between reducing the overhead from the size ofthe M A C and the probability of an undetected alteration.
Encryption and authentication can be combined in two ways: the encryption may be performed first, followed by authentication o f the ciphertext: or alternatively the authentication may be performed on the plaintext. followed by encryption. Both approaches have merits and disadvantages, and the preferred approach often depends on the particular application. Note that JPSEC does not constrain the , .
' .
after encryption depending on the desired functionality. This protection method i s also specified in the SEC header using the authentication template. In order to perform secure transcoding on the JPSEC codestream, a transcoder simply reads and panes the SEC header, identifies the locations of the resolution segmenls, and then retains or removes the appropriate data segmentslresolutions. Notice that this transcoding operation corresponds to a simple paning operation and that it does not require unprotecting the data. Therefore. secure transcodingby-resolution is achieved. Authentication i s performed as well by authenticating the received transcoded data with the M A C value that is placed in the SEC header during the JPSEC protection process.
Also note that with RLCP ordering this same approach can provide finer-grain transcoding, e.g.. by resolution and quality laycr. because it is also a contiguous unit in the bitstream. codestream is i n PCRL ordering, so the data segments corresponding to the three resolution components arc not contiguous. In order tu use segment-based encryption to achieve secure transcoding by resolution, the JPSEC creator first reorders the data s o that the resolution components are in contiguous segments. It then encrypts thc data as described i n the previous usage cxample. Further signaling is uscd to infomi JPSEC decoders of the permutation so that they can undo the operation. The original JPEC-2000 cnlcstream and the protected JPSEC codestream are shown in Figure 3 . In thin example. the signaling information is included hoth in the SEC header and in thc data. The main SEC header contains ZOI parameten that describe the image-related and bitstream-related parameters associated with each data segment. I n this example, after the data reordering there are three conliguous data segments that contain each resolution level. There are also additional ZOI parameters within each data segment; these 201s contain hitstream-related and packet-related parameters that describe the data reordering by specifying the packet information. When the start of packet headers are not used or when encryption is heing performed across the packet headers and bodies, these ZOls can be used to specify packet boundaries within the segment.
This information may be used by a decoder to reassemble the data packets to the ordering used in the original JPEG-2M)D codestream, or by a transcoder to perform fine-grain transcoding operations.
In this example. the SEC header contains the coarse-grain data segment information that describes corresponding image-related and hitstream-related parameters for each data segment. A secure transcoder can use this information to extract any resolution level of the codestream without decrypting the data. In this sense, the end-to-end security of the system is preserved.
Experimental results

.
The JPSEC system shown in Figure 1 was implemented in software. Figure 4 shows decrypted and decoded JPSEC images. A highresolution image was encoded and encrypted into a JPSEC stream using the method described in example usage I with AES encryption applied in CTR mode, and authentication with HMAC using SHA-
I .
The data was encrypted with a granularity of resolution layer.
The full JPSEC stream was decrypted and decoded to form the highresolution image shown. Thc JPSEC stream was securely transcuded into a medium-resolution and low-resolution JPSEC stream using the protcction tool parameters specified in the SEC marker segment.
Thesc JPSEC strrilms were decrypted. authenticated, and decoded to form the medium-and low-rcsolution images shown. Fig. 4 . The IOW-and medium-rcsolulion JPSEC images weir securely transcoded from the high-resolution JPSEC image.
CONCLUSION
This paper describes secure scalable strcaming and secure transcoding with JPSEC. which enables the two seemingly conflicting properties of end-to-end security with secure transcoding at mid-network nodes. We achieve this by designing the JPSEC encryption methods and signaling syntax 10 enable an entity to securely adapt or transcode the resulting JPSEC-protected stream without requiring unprotecting or decrypting the content. Furthermore, this method also provides authentication that the transcoding was performed only in a valid and permissible manner. This enables a potentially untrusted server or mid-network node such as a proxy to pe6orm secure transcoding and enables a JPSEC consumer to authenticate that the received content was transcoded properly.
